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CRIMINOLOGY
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME SERIOUSNESS
AND SUPPORT FOR PLEA-BARGAINING
PRACTICES IN ISRAEL: A FACTORIALSURVEY APPROACH
SERGIO HERZOG*
The settlement of criminal cases through bargained guilty pleas has
been the focus of increasing research interest over the past few decades.
Generally, a plea bargain is reached through an informal process of
negotiation in which the prosecutor and the defense counsel reach an outof-court settlement. In such a settlement, the defendant admits guilt in
return for some concession on the part of the prosecution (e.g., reducing the
number and/or seriousness of the original criminal charges, or
recommending a more lenient punishment than would otherwise be
expected). From the prosecutor's viewpoint, plea bargaining results in
speedy and certain conviction, especially when the evidence against the
defendant is somewhat weak, thereby avoiding the possibility of acquittal in
court, not to mention cost of the trial in terms of time and resources. From
the judge's point of view, plea bargaining reduces the workload of the
court. Research suggests that benefits such as these have led to increasing
resort to plea bargaining. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, a vast majority of
criminal defendants plead guilty after negotiation between the parties as a
matter of course.'

*

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa, Israel.
See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING (1997); CANDACE McCoY, POLITICS AND

PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIM'S RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1993); HEDIEH NASHERI, BETRAYAL OF
DUE PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES

AND CANADA (1998).
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However, despite its high frequency, plea bargaining remains one of

the most controversial procedures in the criminal justice system; some
commentators perceive it as an inevitable and even desirable practice,2
whereas others consider it to be pernicious and immoral.3 Such negative
views of plea bargaining have led to attempts to eliminate it completely, or
to forbid its use for selected offenses.
In the context of this controversy, it is commonly argued that the
public is generally located in the anti-plea bargaining camp, viewing it often
with suspicion and great distaste.' This claim is based on the premise that

members of the public abhor injustice and that, in their opinion, plea
bargaining prevents justice from being served. Because a negotiated plea to

a lesser offense or to a lesser punishment invariably leads to a lesser
sentence, plea bargaining allows offenders to receive lesser punishments
than they would have received had the prosecution proved the more serious

offense at trial. Accordingly, the lay public is expected to voice disapproval
when the judicial system lets an offender escape from a relatively serious
punishment simply because an agreement between his/her defense counsel

and the prosecutor has been reached. Because the public tends to concur
with conservative "law and order" advocates who favor tough policies for
criminals,7 it is often assumed that the public will condemn the practice of
plea bargaining for being soft on offenders by virtue of the relatively lenient
2 E.g., McCoy, supra note 1; Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case
Settlement as a Product of Recursive Decision-Making,30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 335 (1996).
3 E.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY (1998);

Michael Gorr, The Morality of Plea Bargaining,26 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 129 (2000); Gary
D. LaFree, Adversarial and NonadversarialJustice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas and
Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1985); George B. Palermo et al., Plea Bargaining:Injustice
for All?, 42 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1998).
4 E.g., McCoy, supra note 1; MICHAEL L. RUBINSTEIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING (1980); Howard C. Daudistel, On the Elimination of PleaBargaining: The El Paso Experiment, in PLEA BARGAINING 57 (William F. McDonald &
James A. Cramer eds., 1980); Milton Heumann & Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and
the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 393 (1979); Otwin Marenin, The State of Plea Bargainingin Alaska, 18 J. CRIME &
JUST. 167 (1995).
5 E.g., McCoy, supra note 1; Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to
Plea Bargaining,32 CRIM. L. Q. 85 (1989).
6 Patricia A. Payne, Plea Bargaining:A Necessary Evil?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME
AND JUSTICE (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1st ed. 1994).
7 E.g., Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders: An
Analysis of the Public's Views, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 223 (1980); Francis T. Cullen et al.,
Public Opinion About Punishment and Correction, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE I (Michael
Tonry ed., 2000); Richard C. McCorkle, Punish and Rehabilitate? Public Attitudes Toward
Six Common Crimes, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 240 (1993); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion,
Crime, and CriminalJustice, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
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sentences handed down on offenders who admit guilt as a result of plea
bargaining. 8
THE PRESENT STUDY

The main premise of the present study is that, although the assertion
that the public does not like plea bargaining seems logical, the assumption
of general and uniform disapproval of this practice may not be valid and,
therefore, needs to be tested. First, with the exception of a study by Cohen
and Doob, 9 there has been no direct empirical investigation of such public
perceptions. Second, homogeneous public views are often assumed to exist
not only with regard to plea bargaining but also with regard to other crime
topics (for example, criminal sanctions). However, research findings reveal
that when appropriately analyzed, public attitudes are far from being
homogeneous.' 0 Third, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how the public
perceives plea bargaining due to the existence of considerable variation on
many of its central characteristics. Plea bargaining practices may vary with
respect to procedural features, the parties directly involved, their specific
role in the negotiations, the kinds of concession offered, the stage in the
criminal process in which the negotiation may be conducted, and the type of
offenses to which it is applied." The first hypothesis of this study deals
with plea bargaining variability:
If a wide range of plea bargaining practices are presented to
respondents for evaluation, public disapproval for plea bargaining will not
be homogenous, as generally assumed. On the contrary, considerable
heterogeneity will be found in public perceptions of such procedures.
In this study, a factorial survey approach was used in order to take into
account the variability of plea bargaining practices. As will be explained
later,' 2 the factorial survey approach involves presenting respondents with
short, multidimensional descriptions of complex phenomena (such as plea

8 Ronald

Fagan, Public Support for the Courts: An Examination of Alternative

Explanations, 9 J. CRtM. JUST. 403 (1981); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
9 Cohen & Doob, supra note 5; see also Fagan, supra note 8.
1oE.g., Cullen et al., supra note 7; Francis T. Cullen et al., Is Rehabilitation Dead? The
Myth of the Punitive Public, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. 303 (1988); Timothy J. Flanagan & Susan L.
Caulfield, Public Opinion and Prison Policy: A Review, 64(2) PRISON J. 31 (1984);
McCorkle, supra note 7; Roberts, supra note 7; Douglas R. Thomson & Anthony J. Ragona,
Popular Moderation Versus Governmental Authoritarianism: An Interactionist View of
Public Sentiments Toward CriminalSanctions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 337 (1987).
" Emmelman, supra note 2; HERMAN, supra note 1; NASHERI, supra note 1.
12 See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
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bargaining) for their evaluation.' 3 This method overcomes many of the
limitations of other, albeit simpler, survey methods used for assessing
public perceptions of plea bargaining practices.14
It should be emphasized that plea bargaining does not constitute an end
in itself, but rather a judicial means for settling criminal cases out of court.
The second hypothesis of this study takes into account the wide Variety of
criminal offenses that might be subject to plea bargaining agreements:
Public perceptions of plea bargaining will be significantly affected by
public attitudes towards the type of criminal offense settled by such an
agreement. In other words, heterogeneous public attitudes toward different
criminal offenses, ranging theoretically from complete approval to complete
disapproval, will lead to heterogeneous public attitudes toward the plea
bargaining practices used in settling them.
This hypothesis allows for the possibility of a linear relationship
between public attitiides toward various plea bargaining practices and types
of crime; the greater the public disapproval toward the criminal act, the
15
greater the public disapproval for a negotiated out-of-court settlement.
Operationally, variation in public attitudes toward various criminal offenses
is usually assessed in terms of the perceived seriousness of such offenses.
The appropriateness of this approach is exemplified in the following brief
review of crime-seriousness studies.
CRIME-SERIOUSNESS AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD PLEA
BARGAINING
Analysis of public perceptions of the seriousness of criminal offenses
has been featured as a major subject of criminological research since the
publication of Sellin and Wolfgang's influential work, The Measurement of
Delinquency, in 1964.16 Typically, such research involves the deployment
of surveys requiring respondents to evaluate criminal offenses by their
perceived seriousness. Findings in this area help shed light on topics such
as individual and societal reactions to, and evaluations of, crime, cultural
13 See PETER

H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES
AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED (1997); Peter H. Rossi & Andy B. Anderson, The Factorial
Survey Approach: An Introduction, in MEASURING SOC. JUDGMENTS 15 (Peter H. Rossi &
Steven L. Nock eds., 1982).
14 See Cohen & Doob, supra note 5.
15 For similar trends in public opinion toward other criminal procedures, see Julian V.
Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal Record, and the Sentencing Process, 39 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 488 (1996); Bohsiu Wu, Determinantsof Public Opinion Toward Juvenile Waiver
Decisions, 51 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 9 (2000).
16 THORSTEN SELLIN & MARvIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY
(1964).
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belief systems, the role of law in the society, and the relationship between
seriousness of a crime and punishment.17
Such studies point to the existence of wide general agreement and
stability across different social sectors and population groups with regard to
the relative seriousness of behaviors considered to be criminal."8 Because
public conceptions of seriousness appear to emphasize the consequences of
the crime and the harm inflicted on victims, crimes of violence (especially
those in which the victims die or are severely injured) are usually perceived
by the public as the most serious offenses, followed by (in descending
order) property, white-collar, and victimless crime.' 9 Research has also
shown that the greater the perceived seriousness of an offense, the lower the
level of disagreement among respondents, as expressed by the dispersion of
values around the means; hence, the low variation regarding the perceived
high seriousness of violent offenses. 20 These findings lend basic support to
the consensus model of the criminal law, which predicts a close match
between the attitudes of various social groups toward the definition of
certain acts as criminal offenses, their perceived seriousness, and the
reflection of this agreement in the criminal law.2'

17 See generally Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 7; Darnell F. Hawkins, Perceptions

of

Punishment for Crime, I DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 193 (1980); Michael O'Connell & Anthony
Whelan, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 36 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 299 (1996).
18 E.g., Rossi & BERK, supra note 13; MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (1985); Francis T. Cullen et al.,
Consensus in Crime Seriousness: Empirical Reality or Methodological Artifact?, 23
CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1985); Michael Levi & Simon Jones, Public and Police Perceptions of
Crime Seriousness in England and Wales, 25 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1985); Peter H.
Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39
AM. Soc. REV. 224 (1974).
19 See Cullen et al., supra note 18; Levi & Jones, supra note 18; O'Connell & Whelan,
supra note 17.
20 See Cullen et al., supra note 18; Levi & Jones, supra note 18; O'Connell & Whelan,
supra note 17. Moreover, substantial structural correspondence has also been found in
public perceptions of crime seriousness and punishment severity. Joseph E. Jacoby &
Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89
J. CR IM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1999); O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17; Peter H. Rossi
et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting the Punishment to the Crime, I J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1985) (supporting the view that considerations of proportionality underlie
popular conceptions ofjustice); Roberts, supra note 7, at 133.
21 See RossI & BERK, supra note 13; Jacoby & Cullen, supra note 20; Peter H. Rossi & J.
Patrick Henry, Seriousness: A Measure for All Purposes?, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE EVALUATION 489 (Malcolm W. Klein & Katherine S. Teilmann eds., 1980); Charles
W. Thomas et al., Public Opinion on Criminal Law and Legal Sanctions: An Examination of
Two Conceptual Models, 67 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 110 (1976); Mark Warr et al.,
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Perceptions of crime seriousness have been shown to be a reliable
proxy for public attitudes (approval vs. disapproval) toward criminal
offenses. 22 Accordingly, a reformulated version of the second hypothesis
predicts an association between crime-seriousness perceptions and public
attitudes to plea bargaining:
Heterogeneity in public perceptions of crime seriousness will be
associated with heterogeneity in public perceptions of plea bargaining
proceedings. A significant negative linear relationship is expected between
public perceptions of crime seriousness and public support for plea
bargaining practices. More specifically, public approval of plea bargaining
in the case of offenses usually perceived to be more serious (i.e., violent
offenses) will be significantly lower than in the case of offenses usually
perceived to be less serious (i.e., victimless offenses), even to the point of
showing support for plea bargaining in such cases.2 3
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has clear implications for legislative and judicial policy.
First, the views of the public at large regarding judicial practices such as
plea bargaining are an important factor in the considerations and
deliberations of the criminal justice system.24 Indeed, it is crucial for the
25
judicial system to enjoy the respect of those who are served by it.
Research has shown that public preferences and beliefs, particularly
concerning crime seriousness, influence policy decisions in the criminal
justice system. 26 Odegard emphasized popular support as a central
component of the concept of legitimacy, his implication being that policy
mirrors people's attitudes and conforms to the sense of justice of the
Contending Theories of CriminalLaw: Statutory Penalties Versus Public Preferences, 19 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ.

25 (1982).

Roberts, supra note 7; O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17.
23 Note that not only may public attitudes toward plea bargaining be affected by
perceptions of crime seriousness, but prosecutors' decisions concerning the prospects for a
plea bargain are also affected by considerations of crime seriousness. See HERMAN, supra
note 1; Jeffrey A. Roth, Prosecutor Perceptionsof Crime Seriousness, 69 J. CRM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 232 (1978).
24 Roberts, supra note 7.
25 Cohen & Doob, supra note 5; Roberts, supra note 7.
26 Timothy J. Flanagan, Change and Influence in Popular Criminology: Public
Attributions of Crime Causation, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 231 (1987); Deirdre Golash & James P.
Lynch, Public Opinion, Crime Seriousness, and Sentencing Policy, 22 AM J. CRIM. L. 703
(1995); Nelson B. Heller & J. Thomas McEwen, Applications of Crime Seriousness
Information in a Police Department, 12 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 44 (1975); Roth, supra note
23; Martin E. Wolfgang, Seriousness of Crime and a Policy of Juvenile Justice, in DELINQ.,
CRIME & Soc'y 267 (James F. Short, Jr. ed., 1976).
22
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ordinary man or woman. 27 Accordingly, it is argued that a negative view of
the judicial system and its common practices may adversely affect the
public's trust in it, which, consequently, may undermine public readiness to
obey the law. 8
Second, it also important to identify those factors that
aggravate/mitigate public attitudes toward plea bargaining. As mentioned,
there have been calls for the modification and even complete or partial
abolition of plea bargaining for some offenses. 9
Support for the
hypotheses of the present study regarding differential public disapproval of
plea bargaining is likely to hold implications for these and other proposals
for change in plea bargaining practices.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN

As with any public issue, public opinions regarding plea bargaining
could be assessed using poll data. However, the simplistic formats of such
polls (global, unspecific, undifferentiated crime and judicial categories)
tend to elicit homogeneous, simplistic answers to complex issues.
Moreover, control questions are usually not included, and the information
provided to the respondents is limited. Hence, such polls preclude the
possibility of drawing valid conclusions.3 °
The present research was constructed as a survey of public attitudes
toward plea bargaining. Respondents were required to evaluate varied,
hypothetical, specific crime and judicial situations, known as crime
scenarios. This approach has been used widely in assessing public
perceptions of crime seriousness 3' and other crime issues, including plea
bargaining. 32 However, one of the main weaknesses of this method is its
inability to take into account the multiple factors surrounding the scenario
that may influence public attitudes toward its content.33 As previously
Einar Odegard, Legality and Legitimacy, 35(4) BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 525 (1995).
28 Arye Rattner et al., Not Bound by the Law: Legal Disobedience in Israeli Society, 19
27

BEHAV. Sci. & L. 265 (2001); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
29 E.g., McCoy, supra note 1; RUBINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4; Daudistel, supra note 4;

Heumann & Loftin, supra note 4; Marenin, supra note 4.
30 See Brandon K. Applegate et al., Determinants of Public Punitiveness Toward Drunk
Driving: A FactorialSurvey Approach, 13 JUST. Q. 57 (1996); Alexis M. Durham et al.,
Public Supportfor the Death Penalty: Beyond Gallup, 13 JUST. Q. 705 (1996); Roberts,
supra note 7; Rossi & BERK, supra note 13; Thomson & Ragona, supra note 10.
3 E.g., Rossi et al., supra note 18; SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 16; Mark Warr,
What is the Perceived Seriousness of Crimes?, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 795 (1989).
32 See Cohen & Doob, supra note 5.
33 See Applegate et al., supra note 30; Jacoby & Cullen, supra note 20; Roberts, supra
note 7.
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stated, this problem was overcome in the present study by applying a
factorial design methodology.
The factorial design method uses multidimensional scenarios presented
in a form that combines the benefits of controlled, randomized experimental
designs and conventional surveys.34 The scenarios are created by randomly
selecting values (levels) from each of several variables (dimensions; one
level per dimension per scenario) until each dimension is represented and a
complete story is formed. Thus, although (statistically) there is a chance of
two identical scenarios being evaluated, there is a high probability of each
scenario being unique, and of all scenarios representing a random sample of
all possible scenarios available from the universe of all levels across the
chosen dimensionst Rossi and Anderson note that by permitting multiple
dimensions of a crime scenario to vary randomly across scenarios and by
controlling the personal characteristics of the respondents, this technique
allows for exploration of the effects of several independent variables
simultaneously, while permitting unbiased estimates of the contributions of
each of them to the overall judgment of the respondent.3 5 Due to these
advantages, this method has been applied to examine various criminological
issues.36
This possibility of controlling scenario dimensions and respondent
characteristics seems to be decisive, particularly in studies assessing public
perceptions of both crime seriousness and plea bargaining. The perceived
seriousness of given criminal offenses is expected to influence respondents'
attitudes toward plea bargaining (see second hypothesis). Although Cohen
and Doob 3 7 found no variation in public perceptions of plea bargaining by
social variables, research has repeatedly suggested that public perceptions
of crime seriousness vary by social group.3 8
RESEARCH LOCATION

Israel, the location of the present survey, is well suited for the analysis
of public perceptions of judicial practices such as plea bargaining. First,
Israel's small population allows for the collection of a national sample

34 See Rossi & Anderson, supra note 13; Rossi & BERK, supra note 13; Rossi et al.,
supra note 20.
35 Rossi & Anderson, supra note 13; see also Rossi et. al, supra note 20.
36 E.g., Applegate et al., supra note 30 (public punitiveness); Jacoby & Cullen, supra
note 20 (punishment norms); Rossi & BERK, supra note 13 (federal guidelines); Rossi et al.,
supra note 20 (criminal punishments).
37 Cohen & Doob, supra note 5.
38 E.g., Levi & Jones, supra note 18; O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17; Rossi &
Henry, supra note 21; Rossi et al., supra note 18.
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accurately representing "the public," thus enhancing the external validity of
the research. Second, heterogeneity of the research sample may be
important in assessing the attitudes of an assumed "homogenous" public.
Apart from the usual variance found in modem societies with regard to
demographic variables such as gender, age, education, and income, Israeli
society is characterized by marked cultural heterogeneity resulting from
social divisions between, for example, its Jewish majority and Arab
minority, its secular and religious sectors, and its veteran and immigrant
citizens.
Third, and more importantly, influenced by English common law, the
Israeli judicial system and its criminal procedures are also adversarial in
nature, and plea bargaining is conducted very similarly to the way described
in the review. In criminal hearings, the judicial proceedings and the legal
jurisdiction are in the hands of professional judges only; defendants may be
represented by either private or public counsels, and the-State is represented
by district prosecutors. As in other adversarial systems, the prosecutor has
exclusive discretion in invoking the indictment process and determining the
criminal charges against the suspect. Prior to the commencement of court
hearings, the prosecutor has the right to amend or change the charges.
Thereafter, this right is transferred to the court. The prosecutor has the right
to offer a plea bargain to the suspect or his/her attorney(s) at any point in
the judicial process. If the plea bargain is accepted, the defendant will
plead guilty to all or some of the charges included in the indictment, and/or
face a set of amended charges, and/or request a reduced sentence. It should
be noted that plea bargaining proceedings in Israel are regulated by High
Court case law.3 9 For example, the parties involved are required to bring
the written plea bargaining agreement to the court and attach it to the
investigative files, but the court is not bound by it, nor is the court obliged
to base its judgment on it. 40 Last but not least, as elsewhere, the Israeli
judicial system is characterized by case overload. This situation lends itself
to proliferation of out-of-court plea bargaining settlements.
METHOD

The research data was collected from a random sample of the adult
Israeli population (n = 606). The most recent Israeli telephone directories
(2001) provided the sampling framework, and the application of a
systematic random sampling method assured identical probability of
39

Maria R. Haberfeld & Sergio Herzog, The Criminal Justice System in Israel, in

COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: POLICING, JUDICIARY, AND
CORRECTIONS
40 Id.

(Obi N. Ignatius Ebbe ed., 2000).
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Table

Table 1
DescriptiveStatistics (
Variables
Gender ( I = Male)
Ethnicity (1 = Not Jewish)
Religiosity (1 = Traditional / Religious)
Veteran/Innigrant status (1 = New immigrant)
Income (1 = less than 5,000 NIS)
Age (in years)
Education (in schooling years)

1 presents the main

606)
Range
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
15-90
1-22

Mean
.43
.20
.24
.27
.35
35.56
13.55

SD
.49
.42
.42
.44
.48
13.58
2.38

Table 1 shows that the sample was 57% female, 80% Jewish (as
opposed to Arab), 76% secular (as opposed to religious), and 73% were
veteran (as opposed to new immigrant) citizens. These distributions
showed a close fit with official national data on the Israeli population (52%
women; 77% Jewish; 63% secular; 83% veteran). 42 About two-thirds of the
sample reported monthly familial incomes higher than 5000 NIS (about
$1000). This finding is compatible with economic characteristics of the
population (mean familial income: 8500 NIS). The sample was highly
heterogeneous in terms of age (mean age: 35; SD = 13; range: 15-90), and
its educational level was relatively high (13.5 years, i.e., some postsecondary education). Compared with the general population, the sample is
biased in the direction of older and consequently, more educated
correspondents due to the exclusion of respondents under the age of sixteen.
Respondents' attitudes regarding hypothetical scenarios representing
varied criminal offenses and plea bargaining arrangements were collected
by personal, anonymous questionnaires, administered by means of a
telephone survey. Data collection took place during February and March of
2002. Two kinds of possible historical threats to the validity of the findings
were controlled for in this study. First, a content analysis of Israel's major
national newspapers revealed no coverage of possible or actual plea

41 According to formal data of the Ministry of Communications, ninety-eight percent of
households in Israel have telephones, although among certain groups of the population (e.g.,
Arabs) this percentage is a little lower (around ninety-five percent). Based on these data, the
percentage of people not listed in the directories is fairly low.
42 CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL

data about the general population).

(2002) (providing
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bargaining agreements around the time of the survey, which might have
affected respondents' attitudes.43 Second, terrorist, military, and criminal
acts directly related to the Israel-Palestine conflict were excluded from the
study. The present study focused only on criminal offenses typically
committed both in Israel and abroad, and plea bargaining procedures
commonly used for out-of-court settlements.
In light of the research design and the research question, the main
traditional drawbacks of the telephone survey method (low response rate,
inability to include a large number of items and scenario details in the
questionnaire, and limited ability of the researcher to clarify and explain the
survey to respondents) were outweighed by its advantages. First, this
method allows access to a large number of respondents in a relatively short
period of time, thus reducing the chances of historical threats to the internal
validity of the research. Second, as noted, the external validity of the study
was enhanced by the relative ease of obtaining a broad nationally
representative sample.44 To reinforce these advantages, efforts were also
made to overcome some of the relative disadvantages of the telephone
method. Additional re-calls were made to increase the response rate (which
ultimately reached the high level of seventy percent); 45 the questionnaire
was relatively short, citing only six different crime and plea bargaining
scenarios (interview length: about seven to ten minutes); the content of the
questionnaire, hence its final format, was checked in a pre-test using a small
number of respondents; the language was kept as simple as possible; and
the student surveyors were carefully trained by the researcher to prevent
any possible bias.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable of the research was given by respondents'
subjective evaluations of various plea bargaining procedures applied in
settling varied criminal cases. Respondents were required to evaluate plea
bargaining agreements by choosing one value on a Likert scale 46 ranging
43

Based on a content analysis of the three daily newspapers

(YEDIOTH AHRONOTH,

MAARIV, and HAARETZ) with the largest circulation in Israel.
44 Additional advantages of this method are its relatively low cost, ease of standardizing
responses for comparison, minimal danger of the researcher biasing the respondents, and
high level of anonymity.
4' The response rate was calculated on the basis of valid household numbers, excluding
businesses, fax connections, etc. A household was replaced after three unsuccessful
attempts.
46 The Likert-scale includes a series of statements, each of which expresses an attitude
that is either clearly favorable or clearly unfavorable toward an object. These scales call for
a graded response to each statement.
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from one ("Do not support at all") to eleven ("Strongly support"). Because
this categorical scale was essentially a wide-order scale, it was used as an
interval scale. As a result, the values were analyzed statistically as means
and as standard deviations for each level of the independent variables in
order to identify significant differences in the scores assigned to them (more
vs. less support). To increase the uniformity of the evaluative task,
respondents were instructed to base their responses on their personal
evaluation of the plea bargaining proceedings and not on their personal
knowledge of the justice system.47 Moreover, in order to differentiate
between public attitudes toward plea bargaining and its assumed
disappointing result, the plea bargaining outcomes were held constant in all
scenarios: both in implicit or explicit guilty pleas, the judge approved the
guilty plea and handed down a lighter sentence than would have been
served had there been a conviction in court.
THE PLEA BARGAINING SCENARIOS

Six plea bargaining scenarios, varying randomly in dimension, were
presented to each respondent. Their order was determined randomly. As
illustrated at the end of Appendix 1, each scenario consisted of two parts:
first, a specific
criminal act and then, the plea bargaining procedure applied
48
to settle it.
The scenarios contained eight dimensions (A-H) (see Appendix 1),
four related to the crime committed ((A) criminal offense, (B) perceived
seriousness of the crime committed, (C) degree of injury/damage, and (D)
offender's criminal record) and four related to the plea bargaining
agreement ((E) type of plea bargaining agreement, (F) judge's involvement,
(G) victim's participation, and (H) public disclosure of prosecutorial
considerations). 49 As previously explained, to construct a given scenario,
one level from within each of the eight dimensions was selected. Thus, the
scenarios represented a random sample of all possible scenarios available
from the universe of all levels across the chosen dimensions.50
47 For similar proceedings, see Rossi et al., supra note 18; SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra
note 16; Warr, supra note 31.
48 For a similar approach, see Jacoby & Cullen, supra note 20.
49 The decisions regarding the number of dimensions to include in each scenario and the
number of scenarios to present to each respondent were pre-tested and guided by
methodological considerations, such as the use of a telephone survey, interview length, and
full understanding of the scenario.
50It should be noted that the construction of the scenarios deviated slightly from
complete randomization; a few specific combinations of levels were excluded. For example,
if the offender chose to plead guilty implicitly, that is, not as a result of a negotiated plea
bargaining agreement, dimensions related to the plea bargaining procedure were not included
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables of this study were given by two of the four
dimensions related to the criminal act: criminal offense (dimension A) and
perceived seriousness (dimension B). Due to the need for exclusivity and
exhaustibility of the dimension levels, care was taken to span the entire
range of possible variations in each dimension. Accordingly, the ten
offenses described in the scenarios were highly diverse, from very grave
(e.g., murder) to very minor (e.g., petty theft), and inclusive of many kinds
of crime-violent, property, and victimless.5 ' Unlike other studies of crime
seriousness in which offenses were selected from lengthy existing lists, 52 in
this study, offenses were randomly chosen from a larger pre-tested pool of
various offenses representing the population of criminal offenses in Israel.
It should be noted that despite the use of the factorial design approach,
some characteristics of the offenses were kept uniform across all of the
scenarios. All of the criminal acts were described in such a way that there
could be no question as to the responsibility of the offenders and the
consequences of their acts on the victims. Moreover, logic suggests that
any increase in the number of victims would significantly alter the gravity
of the incident. Therefore, all crime scenarios involved a single offender
and a single victim (except for victimless offenses).
Respondents were requested to evaluate the seriousness of the criminal
events by choosing one value on a Likert scale, ranging from one ("Not
serious at all") to eleven ("Very serious"). As in the case of the dependent
variable, this 'wide-order' categorical scale was used as an interval scale 3

in the scenarios. These deviations resulted in low intercorrelations among the dimensions.
Moreover, to increase the range of variation on the latter dimensions, they included
baselines-no details on the specific dimension were included in the scenarios-and various
plea bargaining possibilities.
51For the purpose of this study, victimless offenses were defined broadly (tax evasion,
drug selling, and bribery) in order to juxtapose victimless crimes with victim-crimes, in
which there are specific victims suffering direct harm.
52 E.g., SELLIN

&

WOLFGANG,

supra note 16; Rossi et al., supra note 18;

WOLFGANG ET

AL., supra note 18.
3 O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17. Despite the apparent disadvantages of the
categorical method as opposed to the magnitude estimation method for the evaluation of
crime scenarios, see WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 18, only small differences in various
measurement traits were found between them. E.g., SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 16;
Monica A. Walker, Measuring the Seriousness of Crimes, 18 BRIT. J. CRIMrNOLOGY 348

(1978). Moreover, criticism has been leveled against some aspects of the magnitude
estimation method. E.g., Levi & Jones, supra note 18, at 235-38; Terance D. Miethe, Social
Psychophysical Measurement: A Comparison of the Measurement Propertiesof Magnitude
and Categorical Scaling and Social Perceptions, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 195 (1986). Thus, the

categorical method was preferred.
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Note that although respondents are typically reported as "ranking" the
seriousness of the offenses, in this study, the rankings are in fact determined
by ordering the seriousness means of each offense. Respondents evaluated
the plea bargaining agreement (dependent variable) after evaluating the
seriousness of the offenses.
Previous studies have shown the measurement of crime seriousness to
be problematic because the "seriousness" concept may mean different
things to different respondents; it can be defined in terms of the most
appropriate level of punishment, the degree of injury/damage caused, the
criminal intent of the offender, and/or the wrongfulness of the act. 4
Moreover, respondents have been found to make systematic use of different
aspects of seriousness (wrongfulness, harmfulness) to evaluate different
kinds of offenses."
However, despite the different interpretations
respondents may give to the concept, similar findings have generally been
obtained.56 In this study, in order to increase the uniformity of the
evaluative task, respondents were told at the beginning of the interview that
all of the scenarios referred to acts defined as criminal offenses in Israel
and, as with the dependent variable, their responses should be based on
their personal evaluation of the seriousness of the offenses
and not on their
57
personal knowledge of the legal situation in the country.
CONTROL VARIABLES
It was assumed that the criminal record of the offenders, the
injury/damage inflicted by them, and the kind of plea bargaining agreement
would also affect public attitudes toward plea bargaining. Accordingly, the
remaining six (of the eight) dimensions included in the scenarios
(dimensions C to H) served as control variables.
As mentioned, a quantitative multivariate analysis was applied to
separate and interpret any effects of the scenario dimensions or of
respondent characteristics. Therefore, after evaluating the plea bargaining
scenarios, the respondents were asked to provide some personal details
about themselves (variables 1-0, detailed in Table 1). Thus, the control
variables of the study were provided by six scenario dimensions (C-H) and
seven demographic variables (I-0). The independent variables and both
kinds of control variables were analyzed by multivariate regression analyses

AL., supra note 18; O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17, at 300.
Warr, supra note 31.
O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17; Rossi & Henry, supra note 21.

54 WOLFGANG ET
5
56

57 See SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 16; Rossi et al., supra note 18; Warr, supra
note
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of the respondents' evaluations of the plea bargaining agreement in each
scenario.
RESULTS

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the respondents'
perceptions of crime seriousness (independent variable, dimension B),
evaluations of the plea bargaining proceedings (dependent variable) for the
ten offenses considered in this study (independent variable, dimension A),
and the statistical comparisons between these variables (F and Pearson
tests) for the whole sample of respondents. For ease of interpretation, the
various criminal offenses are ordered according to their perceived
seriousness.
Table 2
Mean Rating and Ranking of 10 CriminalOffenses (DimensionA)
by PerceivedSeriousness (Dimension B) and
Supportfor Plea Bargain(Dependent Variable) in the Whole
Sam le of Respondents (n = 606)
Variable Criminal
Offense
1. Wife murder
2. Girl rape
3. Vehicular homicide
4. Shop robbery
5. Wife assault
6. Apartment burglary
7. Clerk bribe
8. Watch theft
9. Drug selling

10. Tax evasion
F-test
Significant differences
Mean-SD Pearson
Seriousness-Opinion Pearson
* p < 0 .0 5

262
317
306
181
332
346
386
481
404

Perceived
Seriousness
Mean
SD
10.68
1.35
10.33
1.53
10.10
1.71
9.24
1.50
8.95
2.98
8.84
2.14
8.25
2.38
8.10
2.18
8.05
2.42

Support for
Plea Bargain
Mean
SD
3.75
3.24
4.40
3.62
5.66
3.64
5.16
3.49
6.09
3.51
6.28
3.53
5.62
3.49
6.24
3.36
5.78
3.65

414

6.63

7.14

Number of
Scenarios

3.26

103.39*
(1, 2, 3) >
(4, 5, 6) >
(7, 8, 9) > 10
-. 835*

3.33

25.67*
1 < (all, exc. 2)
2 < (all, exc. 4)
all < 10
.043
-.856*
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Table 2 shows that in general, violent offenses (wife murder, girl rape,
vehicular homicide) were ranked as the significantly most serious offenses
(means over ten out of a maximum score of eleven on the Likert scale). All
such offenses featured a personal victim and severe harm (death, serious
injury). At the opposite extreme, some property and victimless offenses
(tax evasion, drug selling, watch theft) were ranked as the significantly least
serious offenses. Unlike the most serious offenses, these scenarios do not
have victims at all (selling drugs) or specific persons as victims (offenses
against public and even private institutions). Note that the most serious
offenses were associated with the lowest standard deviations, and the less
serious the ranking of the offense, the higher its standard deviation. A very
strong negative linear relationship (statistically significant at p < 0.01) was
found between the means and standard deviations of the perceived
seriousness of the ten offenses.
With regard to assessment of the plea bargaining agreement (the
dependent variable), Table 2 shows that the two significantly most serious
offenses-wife murder and girl rape-were associated with the lowest
support for out-of-court plea bargaining settlements (means below four and
five, respectively; range on Likert scale, one to eleven). Conversely, the
strongest support for plea bargaining was obtained for the significantly least
serious offense-tax evasion (mean over seven). Again, a very strong
negative linear relationship (also statistically significant at p < 0.01) was
found between the crime-seriousness perceptions and attitudes toward plea
bargaining. However, in contrast to perceived crime-seriousness, the
standard deviations of attitudes toward plea bargaining were relatively large
and almost identical for all the offenses considered. Accordingly, no linear
relationship was found between the standard deviations and the
corresponding means of public support for plea bargaining.
Table 3 presents the distribution of the extreme (one and eleven) and
grouped (not serious vs. serious; no support vs. support) values of both
variables (seriousness perceptions and attitude toward plea bargaining). For
ease of interpretation, these values are presented only for the significantly
most serious and least serious offenses, as indicated in Table 2.
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Table 3 shows that almost all of the respondents in the sample (more
than ninety-five percent) perceived the most serious offenses (wife murder,
girl rape, vehicular homicide) as relatively serious (seriousness values from
seven to eleven), and most respondents (two-thirds to over ninety percent)
perceived them as "very serious" (extreme value of eleven). In the case of
the least serious offenses (watch theft, drug selling, tax evasion), the
proportion of respondents who provided low seriousness scores ranged
from over one-tenth to over one-third. Note that one-tenth evaluated tax
evasion as "not serious at all," and only fourteen to eighteen percent
evaluated these offenses as "very serious."
As shown in Table 2, the values obtained for the plea bargaining
agreements were inversely related to those obtained for the criminal
offenses. In the case of the most serious offenses, most of the respondents
(one-half increasing to seventy percent with perceived offense seriousness)
did not support plea bargaining (support values from one to five), one- to
two-fifths providing the lowest possible support value of one. However, for
the least serious offenses, most of the respondents (one-half to sixty
percent) supported plea bargaining, over one-fifth providing the highest
support value of eleven for tax evasion.
The effect of these independent variables on the plea bargaining
support values (dependent variable) was also analyzed using a multivariate
regression model taking into account the control variables: the remaining
scenario dimensions (C-H) and personal characteristics of the respondents
(1-0). Table 4 presents the standardized regression coefficients of all of the
scenario dimensions and respondent variables included in the models, for
the whole sample of respondents. In addition, the regression analysis was
also structured hierarchically by conducting a separate regression analysis
for each independent and control variable. Each successive analysis
includes all the variables from the preceding equation plus an additional
variable. This analysis shows how much additional variance was explained
by adding successive variables to the model.
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Table 4
Standardizedand HierarchicalRegression Coefficientsfor Support
for Plea Bargain by Scenario Dimensions and Respondents' Personal
Details in the Whole Sample of Respondents (n = 606
Variable

Values
4

.9

-,

A. Criminal
offense'

6

B. Perceived
seriousness
-.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Girl rate
Vehicular homicide
Shop robbery
Wife assault
Apartment burglary
Clerk bribe
Watch theft
Drug selling
Tax evasion

Interval (1= "Not serious at all")
A

F. Judicial
involvement in
plea bargain 2

S

-.
029

0 = Yes;
1 =No
1. Charge (deleting) plea bargain
2. Charge (replacement) plea
bargain

.172"*

3. Sentence plea bargain

.071**

1. Judge as encouraging parties
2. Judge as arbitrator
3. Judge as active participant

.100**
.123"*
.078*

1. Informed about the wish for

.073**

.021
.062**

.173

.187

.210

plea bargain

G. Victim's

participation i

2. Informed on the plea bargain's
details
3. Allocution about the final plea

2

.067**
.096**

bargain

H. Prosecutorial
considerations in
plea bargain 2
--

I

-.161"*

0 = Relatively light;
I = Serious

E. Type of plea
bargain 2

.184**
.140**
.123"*
.185**
.183**
.171"*
.170**
.211**

.1

L

Y

C. Degree of
damage
D. Offender's
crim. record

plea bargain

£

Stand.
coeff.
.101"*

1. Certain conviction

4

2. Time saving
I

3. Money saving
-

-

A

.098**
-. 134**
.037

.229
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Table 4

(Continued)
.030
.002
-.047*

.243
.243
.249

L.
> Income

0 = Female; 1= Male
Interval (in years)
Interval (in schooling years)
0 = more than 5,000 NIS;
1 = less

.058**

.259

M. Ethnicity
N. Religiosity

0 = Jewish; 1 = not Jewish
0 = secular; 1 = trad./religious

.012
-.013

.260
.260

-.032
.3

.261

I. Gender
J. Age
K. Education
.

0

U

0.0
1

S

i

=

veteran; 1 = new immigrant

1country10=veea;I=nwimgnt

*p < 0 .00 50
** p < . 1
"Wife murder" is the reference group (n = 262). The values are ordered
according to perceived seriousness (dimension B).
2 Each baseline represents the reference group (n = 717, 1260, 693 and 806,
respectively).
Table 4 shows that even when other scenario dimensions and
respondents' characteristics are taken into account, all of the values of the
independent variables presented significant regression coefficients, adding
considerable explanatory power to support for plea bargaining practices.
For criminal offense (dimension A), the coefficients were positive.
Compared to wife murder (the most serious offense; reference group),
support for plea bargaining for all other offenses was significantly higher.
Note that the strength of the significant coefficients increased linearly with
the decrease in perceived seriousness. This finding is also expressed by the
negative sign of the significant coefficient of the second independent
variable-perceived seriousness (dimension B).
It should be noted that other control variables also showed significant
coefficients, some even reflecting a stronger effect on respondents' attitudes
than some of the aforementioned independent variables. First, note the
significant coefficient for offender's criminal record (dimension D), which
is in the same direction as the aforementioned coefficients. The existence
of a previous criminal record (a relatively more serious situation for the
respondents) was associated with a significant decrease in support for plea
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bargaining. Second, note some values of the type of plea bargaining
settlement (dimension E), and mainly the significantly positive coefficients
obtained for almost all of the values of judicial involvement, victim
participation,and the prosecutorial consideration of "certain conviction,"
which significantly raised support for plea bargaining (dimensions F to H).
Note, however, the significant negative coefficient for "time-saving" of the
prosecution and the judiciary and the non-significant coefficient for "money
saving" (dimension H). With regard to the personal variables, only
respondent's income (dimension L) produced a significant (p < 0.01), albeit
relatively low, regression coefficient. As Table 4 shows, adding these
variables in later equations added little explanatory power.
DISCUSSION
As already stated, the literature on plea bargaining generally assumes
that the public at large uniformly dislikes the practice of plea bargaining.58
However, in view of the wide variability of plea bargaining proceedings and
the seriousness of the offenses discussed during plea-bargain negotiations
and the lack of empirical studies measuring the relationship between these
two factors, such an assertion may not be valid.
The findings of the present study do not support this common
assumption. In fact, wide variability was found in the evaluation of varied
hypothetical plea bargaining scenarios. As predicted by the first hypothesis
of this study, attitudes toward plea bargaining were widely distributed along
a continuum, from significant disapproval (for the significantly most
serious criminal offenses) to significant approval (for the significantly least
serious offenses). This variability was expressed by significant differences
in plea bargaining support values and means for various types of offenses
and by relatively large standard deviations, regardless of type of offense
(Tables 2 and 3). This last finding should be emphasized: unlike the
significantly negative linear relationship between standard deviations and
crime seriousness perceptions, 9 the dispersion of values for plea bargaining
support remained constant along all the evaluated offenses. This finding
points to the existence of wide variability in public attitudes toward plea
bargaining with regard to all offenses, irrespective of their perceived
seriousness, as predicted by the second hypothesis of this study.
The study also found that criminal and judicial variables
(characteristics of the committed offense; nature of the plea bargaining
58

See McCoy, supra note 1; Payne, supra note 6; Cohen & Doob, supra note 5; Fagan,

supra note 8; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 8.
59 See Cullen et al., supra note 18; Levi & Jones, supra note 18; O'Connell & Whelan,
supra note 17.
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agreement) varying randomly in hypothetical scenarios significantly
affected these heterogeneous plea bargaining perceptions (Table 4). The
second hypothesis of the study, which predicted a significant negative linear
relationship between perceptions of crime seriousness and support for outof-court plea bargaining settlements, was completely supported by the
research findings. On the one hand, violent offenses, such as wife murder,
girl rape, and vehicular homicide (personal victim/serious injury) received
the significantly highest seriousness means (and usually the smallest
standard deviations) and, accordingly, they were ranked by the whole
sample of respondents as the most serious offenses. In addition, the
significantly lowest seriousness means (and usually the largest standard
deviations) were obtained for offenses with no victim at all or no specific
personal victim, such as theft from a shop, drug selling, and tax evasion. In
general, these results are compatible with previous findings regarding
consensual perceptions of crime seriousness.60
On the other hand,
respondents expressed significantly lower support for plea bargaining
agreements in the case of the most serious offenses, and wider support for
negotiated out-of-court plea bargaining settlements in the case of the least
serious offenses (Table 2). These trends were also found when perceived
crime seriousness and support for plea bargaining were presented (grouped
and separated) for these extreme (serious vs. non-serious) offenses (Table
3). Moreover, these findings remained significant and maintained their
high explanatory power even after other control variables, including other
judicial and criminal factors and respondents' personal characteristics, were
taken into account in a regression analysis (Table 4). Theoretically, these
findings may be explained on both retribution and incapacitation groundsthe public expects that offenders who commit more serious offenses would
receive more serious punishments and would be controlled for longer
periods of time. Thus, it may be concluded that contrary to the assumption
of homogeneous, global, low support for plea bargaining practices, there
exists wide heterogeneity, influenced by, among other things, perceived
offense seriousness: the more serious the offense, the lower the support for
plea bargaining. 6'
From the public's point of view, therefore, the
introduction of formal guidelines that would limit or modify the practice of
plea bargaining, abolishing it for serious offenses,62 would obtain more
supra note 16; WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 18; Cullen et
al., supra note 18; Levi & Jones, supra note 18; O'Connell & Whelan, supra note 17; Rossi
et al., supra note 18.
61 For similar results concerning other criminal procedures, see Roberts, supra note 15;
Wu, supra note 15.
62 For example, as attempted in California, New York, see McCoy, supra note 1, at 2934, and for Michigan, see Heumann & Loftin, supra note 4.
60

See SELLIN &

WOLFGANG,
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support than sweeping attempts to abolish plea bargaining practices
completely for all types of offenses.63
In the view of the negative influence of offenders' criminal records on
public support for plea bargaining (Table 4), recidivist offenders might also
be disqualified from partaking in such out-of-court settlements. This
finding is consistent with earlier results relating criminal history to public
punitiveness. 64 Yet another significant finding of this study is the negative
relationship between the traditional covertness and low visibility of plea
bargaining procedures and public support for plea bargaining (Table 4).
This finding points to the need to open the plea bargaining
process to
65
typical outside parties, such as judges, victims, and the public.
In interpreting this predicted negative relationship between crime
seriousness and public support for plea bargaining, it is worth mentioning
the role of the written and electronic media 6 6 -the main source of
information about crime and criminal justice issues for most people.
Generally, the media tend to distort reality by drawing attention to serious
violent offenses, on the one hand, and on the other, the apparent leniency of
the judicial system in its handling of such crimes, as in the case of plea
bargaining practices. Research into the effect of the media on these
variables would undoubtedly shed more light on the issues raised in this
study.
Finally, it should be added that unlike criminal and judicial variables,
with the exception of income, public views of plea bargaining were hardly
affected by social variation (Table 4). This finding, compatible with the
findings of Cohen and Doob, is particularly important when the social
context of the research is taken into account.67
Israel, like the
overwhelming majority of Western societies today, is internally divided
along various social and cultural dimensions.68 Nevertheless, Table 4
shows that personal characteristics of the respondents did not significantly
affect public perceptions of plea bargaining practices. Thus, we can
conclude that the heterogeneity in public attitudes to plea bargaining found
in this study was not a function of the heterogeneity of the national sample
of respondents. As predicted, it seems to reflect the heterogeneity of plea

63

For example, see RUBINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4 (Alaska); Marenin, supra note 4

(Alaska); Daudistel, supra note 4 (El Paso).
64 E.g., Applegate et al., supra note 30; Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 7.
65 See McCoY, supra note 1; Cohen & Doob, supra note 5.
66 For a review, see Roberts, supra note 7.

67 Cohen & Doob, supra note 5.
68 See Sammy Smooha, Internal Divisions in Israel at Forty, 20 MIDDLE E. REV. 26
(1988).
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bargaining practices and, basically, the heterogeneity of the criminal
offenses and offenders in them.
CONCLUSIONS

Although widespread, plea bargaining remains one of the most
controversial practices in the modem judicial system. Some commentators
emphasize its practical advantages; others tend to emphasize its theoretical
limitations. Plea bargaining is widely assumed to have a bad public image.
The literature on plea bargaining generally assumes that members of the
public, as conservative advocates of "law and order," constitute reliable
representatives of the "anti-plea bargaining" camp, perceiving plea
bargaining simplistically as a judicial mechanism by which offenders
ultimately receive lighter sentences than they deserve. 69 This assertion
assumes that the public is uniformly and homogeneously opposed to plea
bargaining practices.
However, contrary to this common assumption, the findings of this
study reveal wide heterogeneity in the public view 'of plea bargaining.
Indeed, rather than constituting a discrete variable, public attitudes toward
plea bargaining should be conceptualized as a continuous variable, ranging
from complete disapproval to full support. Moreover, these heterogeneous
views were found to be significantly affected by both criminal and judicial
variables. Specifically, the more serious the settled case, as expressed by
public perceptions of crime seriousness (and also by existence of a criminal
record), the weaker the public support for plea bargaining, and vice versa.
This differential perception of plea bargaining for serious and nonserious offenses contraindicates claims of rigid homogeneity and
punitiveness regarding public views on crime issues. Opinion polls have
played a decisive role in perpetuating such claims, their results purporting
to show increased public support for harsher criminal sanctions, such as the
death penalty, and homogeneous perceptions regarding the overly lenient
treatment of offenders by the courts. The conclusion of the present study
serves to counter such claims. Contrary to common assertions of
uniformity, public attitudes regarding crime issues are anything but simple.
Indeed, they are "diverse, multidimensional, and complex., 70 The reason
for contradictory findings in this area may well stem from the survey
methodology. Research has shown that respondents tend to be less
homogeneous and unequivocal when they are presented with more

69
70

Cohen & Doob, supra note 5, at 102.
Flanagan & Caulfield, supra note 10, at 41; see also Cullen et al., supra note 10;

Roberts, supra note 7; McCorkle, supra note 7; Thomson & Ragona, supra note 10.

SERGIO HERZOG

[Vol. 94

information for their evaluation and when more sophisticated survey
methods are used.71 This explanation is reinforced by the experience of the
present study. Compared to previous attempts to assess public attitudes
toward plea bargaining by simpler survey methods, which revealed
homogeneously negative perceptions, 72 the findings of this study indicate
that rather than uniformly opposing plea bargaining, the public at large,
regardless of social variables, appears to be located along a continuum of
attitudes. Their evaluations are based on specific rather than global
considerations; they are open, rather than close-minded; and they see plea
bargaining as a flexible judicial means for settling criminal acts out of court
rather than as a rigid goal in itself. Thus, additional variables not included
in this study, such as victim restitution, may also bring about public support
for plea bargaining settlements when applied to serious offenses.
Is it possible to generalize the findings obtained in the Israeli context
to other societies? The answer to this question must surely be in the
affirmative. First, as already noted, Israel is similar to most AngloAmerican countries with regard to perceived crime-seriousness findings and
plea bargaining practices. Second, this study excluded terrorist events and
ideologically-motivated acts of violence, which could have set Israeli
respondents apart from equivalent respondents in Anglo-American
countries. This study analyzed criminal offenses and plea bargaining
procedures typical of, and held in common with, other countries. Third, the
regression findings showed that personal characteristics of respondents did
not affect their attitudes toward plea bargaining. Such attitudes were
basically affected by the offense committed and, to a lesser extent, by
characteristics of the offender and the plea bargaining settlement.

71 See ANTHONY N. DOOB & JULIAN V. ROBERTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC'S VIEW OF
SENTENCING (1983); Roberts, supra note 7; Applegate et al., supra note 30; Durham et al.,

supra note 30.
72 E.g., Cohen & Doob, supra note 5.
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APPENDIX 1
DIMENSIONS AND LEVELS:
A. CriminalAct and C. Degree of Injury/Damage
1. A man suspected that his wife was cheating on him. When he was alone
with her, he injured her and she died later / killed her by stabbing her.
2. A man returned home earlier than usual, discovered his wife with
another man, and beat her lightly / seriously.
3. A man asked a girl out on a date and during it, raped her / forcefully.
4. A man driving his car at high speed in a residential area hit a pedestrian
causing the pedestrian critical injury / death.
5. A man broke into an apartment and stole jewels and money worth NIS
500 / 10,000.
6. A man shoplifted a watch worth NIS 500 / 10,000.
7. A man entered a jewelry shop and, at gunpoint, stole NIS 500 / 10,000
from the cash register.
8. A man filed an income tax return declaring an income NIS 500 / 10,000
lower than his actual income.
9. A man sold marihuana and hashish / heroin and cocaine from his home.
10. A municipal employee received NIS 500 / 10,000 from a contractor
and, in return, helped him win a contract.
B. Perceived Crime Seriousness (filed by respondents)
Values 1 ("Not serious at all") to 11 ("Very serious")
D. CriminalRecord of Offender
1. Yes/2. No
E. Type ofPlea-BargainAgreement
1. The defendant pleaded guilty on his/her own initiative, hoping to receive
a lighter sentence. The judge approved the plea, sentencing the offender to
a relatively low sentence (baseline).
2. An agreement was reached by which the defendant would plead guilty
and, as a concession, the prosecutor would remove a charge from the
indictment sheet.
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3. An agreement was reached by which the defendant would plead guilty
and, as a concession, the prosecutor would change the original charge to a
less serious one.
4. An agreement was reached by which the defendant would plead guilty
and, as a concession, the prosecutor would recommend that the judge hand
down a relatively light sentence.
F. JudicialInvolvement in the Plea Bargain
1. Before the trial, negotiation between the defense counsel and the
prosecutor was conducted in the prosecutor's office (judge's role not
mentioned; baseline).
2. Before the trial, the judge encouraged the defense counsel and the
prosecutor to reach an agreement, noting the advantages of such agreement
for the defendant (speedy disposition of the case, relatively light sentence).
Then, negotiation between the defense counsel and the prosecutor was
conducted in the prosecutor's office.
3. Before the trial, negotiation between the defense counsel and the
prosecutor was conducted in the judge's office. The judge was present
during the negotiations, serving as arbitrator.
4. Before the trial, negotiation between the defense counsel and the
prosecutor was conducted in the judge's office. The judge participated
actively in the discussions in reaching an agreement between the parties.
G. Victim's Participationin Plea Bargain
(when the victim died-levels I and 4 of dimension A-the victim'sfamily was

included, this dimension was not included in victimless offenses: levels 8 to 10 of
dimension A)

1. (Not mentioned; baseline).
2. The prosecutor informed the (family of the) victim of the wish to reach
an agreement with the defendant.
3. The prosecutor informed the (family of the) victim on the details of the
agreement to be proposed to the defendant and noted his/her remarks.
4. The (family of the) victim expressed his/her (its) views concerning the
agreement reached directly to the judge before accepting it.
H. ProsecutorialConsiderationsin Plea Bargain
1. (Not mentioned; baseline).
2. The prosecutor detailed the advantage of the plea bargain agreement to
the public: The defendant would be convicted, with no risk of a possible
acquittal (the evidence against the defendant was, in fact, weak).
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3. The prosecutor detailed the advantage of the plea bargain agreement to
the public: Important time would be saved by the court and prosecution for
handling other cases.
4. The prosecutor detailed the advantage of the plea bargain agreement to
the public: Considerable expense would be saved from the public budget for
handling other cases.
SAMPLED, FULL SCENARIO:

A man broke into an apartment and stole jewels and money worth NIS
10,000. In your opinion, how serious was this act?
Not serious at all
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very Serious
10
11

The man was caught by the police. He had a criminal record. Before the
trial, negotiation between the defense counsel and the prosecutor was
conducted in the judge's office. The judge participated actively in the
discussions in reaching an agreement between the parties. An agreement
was reached by which the defendant would plead guilty and, as a
concession, the prosecutor would delete a charge from the indictment sheet.
In the agreement, the prosecutor detailed the advantage of the plea bargain
for the public: Important time would be saved by the court and the
prosecution for handling other cases. The judge approved the agreement,
sentencing the offender to a relatively low sentence.
To what extent do you support the judicial process in this situation?
Do not support at all
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly support
9
10
11
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